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Abstract: This article aims to explain why, despite the fact that all national competition 
authorities (NCAs) in EU member states enforce the same law, relevant differences exist in the 
degree of independence that these agencies enjoy. The author advances an original theoretical 
framework according to which the decision on the independence of NCAs depends on the 
structure of the economic system of a country. In particular, it is hypothesized that the means 
by which firms operate in the national market affects the tendency of national legislators to 
delegate more or less independence to the NCA. The statistical analysis carried out shows that 
both countries with low and high levels of employer density tend to have less independent 
competition authorities than those of other countries. On the one hand, the findings support the 
argument, advanced by varieties-of-capitalism scholars, that liberal market economies and 
coordinated market economies achieve greater efficiency than mixed market economies. On the 
other, the expectation that all institutional choices should be coherent with the firms’ 
coordination method is not confirmed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Independence is often considered as a necessary prerequisite for regulatory agencies. 
Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) deal with complex issues that require expertise, they 
must quickly respond to changes in the economic environment, and they must “shield market 
interventions from interference from captured politicians and bureaucrats” (OECD, 2002: 95). 
But not all IRAs are equally independent. If we take into account two competition authorities, 
the German Bundeskartellamt and the Italian Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, 
and we ask which one enjoys higher formal independence, many people (including experts) 
would indicate the first. Yet, they would be wrong. All the members of the Italian competition 
authority are appointed for seven years (the Parliament is elected for five years), and they 
cannot be removed from their office, while the President of the German competition authority 
does not have a fixed term of office. The Bundeskartellamt is under the authority of the Federal 
Ministry of Economy, while the Italian competition authority is completely separate from the 
government. Why these differences? Are Italian politicians more interested in competition 
enforcement than German ones? Does Italy need to show its commitment to competition more 
than Germany does?  
 
Over the last 20 years, national governments and parliaments have delegated an increasing 
number of tasks to IRAs, in various policy fields (competition enforcement, stock exchange 
markets, telecommunications, energy, pharmaceuticals, etc.). The spread of these agencies has 
coincided with processes of de-regulation and privatization, and has been identified as “the rise 
of the regulatory state” (Majone, 1994) and as new form of “regulatory capitalism” (Levi-
Faur, 2005): market liberalization has been accompanied by a proliferation of rules and 
authorities in charge of enforcing them (Vogel, 1996).  
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Many books and articles have been written on IRAs, and several attempts have been made to 
explain their independence. However, these attempts have been, to a large extent, 
unsatisfactory: a large part of the literature analyses only the US institutional system, thus 
lacking any comparative perspective (see for instance Fiorina, 1982; Weingast and Moran, 
1983; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1987; Moe, 1990; Bawn, 1995); 
another branch of the literature has adopted a comparative perspective, but has mainly focused 
on the establishment of IRAs, and not on the amount of discretion conferred on them 
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002; Wilks and Bartle, 2002; Levi-Faur, 2004; Jordana and Levi-
Faur, 2005); the contributions which have empirically tested some of the theories of delegation 
by explaining formal independence of regulatory agencies are limited 
(Gilardi, 2002; 2005; Elgie and McMenamin, 2005; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010) and all of 
them have analysed a different sample of IRAs. It is therefore very difficult to compare the 
findings of these studies them and draw univocal conclusions about their results. 
 
This article focuses on a particular subset of IRAs – national competition authorities (NCAs) – 
and it aims to contribute to the literature on both regulatory agencies and European competition 
policy. These two literatures seem to practically ignore each other. Scholars who study IRAs 
tend to analyse their institutional features without paying enough attention to the legislative and 
administrative framework in which agencies are embedded. In this respect, I argue that a 
sector-oriented focus gives a much better grasp of the reasons that explain agency 
independence – though not everything can be explained by sector-specific factors. European 
competition policy experts, on the other hand, often treat NCAs as “satellites” of the 
Commission, and fail to acknowledge their impact on competition enforcement at the national 
level.  
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In Europe, competition enforcement was introduced by the European Coal and Steel 
Community treaty (1951), and was further expanded by the European Economic Community 
(ECC) treaty (1957), before any European country established a NCA. Thus, competition 
policy is an example of policy that has first been promoted at the EU level, and only at a later 
stage adopted by the member states. For several decades, most European countries (with the 
exception of Germany and UK) did not have an autonomous competition regime. Competition 
enforcement was carried out directly by the Commission, which enjoyed considerable 
autonomy in this field (Kassim and Wright, 2009: 741). After the Single European Act (1986), 
the activism of the Commission increased, and the adoption of the European Merger regulation 
in 19891 strengthened and broadened the scope of the EEC antitrust legislation 
(Cini and McGowan, 1998: 32–33). At the same time, members of the EEC and candidate 
countries began to adopt national competition legislations and to establish NCAs. The issue of 
the coordination between EU and national legislation, and between the Commission and the 
NCAs, became of primary importance (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 189). Germany proposed the 
creation of a European Cartel Office (ECO): according to proponents of this approach, a 
European independent agency would have insured a stricter and more consistent enforcement 
of competition law among all the member states (Wilks and McGowan, 1995; 1996). The fact 
that DG Competition had to strive for obtaining a majority vote on all its decisions within the 
Commission was seen as a major limitation of the EEC competition regime (see 
Karagiannis 2010, on the implications of collegiality in European competition policy).  
 
This debate came to an end in 2003, with the adoption of European Council Regulation 1/2003. 
No ECO was created (the decision-making process at the EU level did not change); instead, 
much emphasis was placed on the coordination between the Commission and NCAs. The latter 
were empowered to enforce both national and EU competition law. To allocate competencies 
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and to discuss strategies and best practices, it was decided to set up the European Competition 
Network (ECN), a forum in which Commission and NCAs periodically meet and exchange 
information about their activity. Regulation 1/20032 prevents member states from enforcing 
competition law through executive bodies which are not formally separate from the 
government, by requiring that every member state delegate competition enforcement to a 
“competition authority” or to the courts.3 At the same time, the regulation does not specify 
either that these bodies have to be independent or how much independence they ought to enjoy. 
Europe therefore has a very peculiar regime, in which 27 countries apply the same competition 
law, but with very different administrative instruments. 
 
As stated earlier, independence is usually regarded as a positive characteristic for regulatory 
agencies, and competition authorities are not an exception. First of all, the functions of these 
bodies are para-judiciary in the context of investigations on suspected illegal conducts and 
consequent decisions: thus, everyone expects that they decide solely on the basis of law and 
that they judge facts impartially. Second, an independent NCA is meant to attract private 
investment and create a business environment that cannot be influenced by political 
fluctuations. Third, in many countries national governments still own companies that play a 
relevant role in the market: it is therefore crucial, for national and international competitors, 
that the executive does not make decisions in which it would have a clear conflict of interest. 
 
However, these are not the only motivations that politicians have in mind when they decide on 
the degree of independence to be given to IRAs, and this is particularly evident in the case of 
competition authorities in the EU member states. Indeed, as has been said, all these regulators 
apply the same law: if their independence were decided only for reasons related to their tasks, 
they should all be very similar in this respect.4 We instead observe relevant differences between 
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them (see Figure 1), and, what is more, their degree of autonomy from the political sphere is 
not always as we would expect: how many people, asked whether the German or the Romanian 
competition authority is formally more independent from the government, would indicate the 
latter?  
 
The aim of this article is therefore to investigate which factors explain the variation in the 
formal independence of NCAs in the EU. To do so, I advance and test a theoretical framework 
in which the final outcome (the amount of independence enjoyed by the competition authority) 
depends on the structure of the economic system of a country. In particular, I hypothesize that 
the means by which firms operate in the internal market (i.e. through free competition, through 
coordination, or through a mix of both) affects the tendency of national legislators to delegate 
more or less independence to the NCA. The article is structured as follows. I will first present 
the model that I develop to explain delegation to NCAs, and the hypothesis that I draw from it. 
Then, I will illustrate the data and the operationalization of the variables. Finally, I will show 
the results of a statistical analysis conducted on all the competition authorities of the EU 
member states, and discuss its main implications. 
 
 
INDEPENDENCE AND “VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM”: A NEW INSIGHT 
 
Competition authorities represent one of the ways by which states regulate the economy. The 
implementation of competition law has a primary importance in modern democracies, as it 
concerns the way in which public and private interests are related. Competition law aims to find 
a balance between private property rights and the public interest (Peritz, 1990), in order to 
avoid the prospect that some people’s freedom turns into “coercion, impositions on others” 
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(Amato, 1997: 2). Competition authorities are the instruments that modern market economies 
have typically employed to safeguard this balance. We have already mentioned why their 
independence is meant to be important. Besides practical considerations, independence also has 
a symbolic value: the fact that politicians give up control on certain issues and delegate them to 
independent bureaucrats can influence the expectations of the economic actors, and improve 
economic performance (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Majone, 1996; 
Rogoff, 1985). However, it must also be stressed that competition enforcement is not just a 
“technical” application of abstract principles: it involves allowing some firms to acquire others 
(therefore, the creation of bigger economic actors), assessing the damage that anti-competitive 
practices may cause to other firms, and imposing sanctions and fines. As former competition 
commissioner Karol van Miert argued, “competition policy is not something neutral, it is 
‘politics’” (cited by Wilks and McGowan, 1995: 268). Competition enforcement decisions 
always have important redistributive effects (among firms and consumers), and they can have a 
remarkable impact on the economy. Hence, governments are obviously concerned about what 
competition agencies do.  
 
The assumption that I make is that politicians5 prefer not to delegate power to an independent 
authority in salient policy fields like competition enforcement.6 This assumption is based on 
that of principal-agent (P-A) theory (Miller, 2005; Ross, 1973), according to which the 
preferences of the principal (legislators, in this case) and the agent (the NCA) are meant to be 
different. In cases of divergent preferences, any policy outcome chosen by the agent will be 
more distant from the principal’s ideal point than if the principal had chosen the policy 
outcome by her/himself. Politicians can however find it convenient to delegate because this 
reduces their workload and allows them to regulate technically complex policy areas 
(Franchino, 2002: 678) or because delegation allows them to “shift the blame” for potentially 
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unpopular measures (Fiorina, 1982). However, we have neither variation in technical 
complexity as regards competition enforcement in EU member states (because we have the 
same policy enforcement in all countries), nor have we blame-shifting (because breaking 
cartels or sanctioning monopolists are usually quite popular decisions). Therefore, we must 
point to other differences in order to explain why various degrees of independence are chosen.  
 
I argue that what differs among the EU member states is the opportunity-cost of delegating to a 
competition agency. For some countries, giving little independence to the NCA does not 
represent a high cost. For others, it does. Given the assumption previously made, I posit that the 
level of formal independence that the legislators will chose for the NCA will be a function of 
the cost of not delegating for that particular country: the higher this cost, the higher the 
independence. Since an independent competition authority is supposed to embody the 
commitment of a government to treat all investors fairly and to offer a stable regulatory 
environment, not subject to political oscillations, the opportunity-cost of giving independence 
to the NCA is represented by how attractive the system is for investors independent of 
competition enforcement. Some may claim that it is not possible to disentangle attractiveness 
for investors from competition enforcement. I will argue the contrary. 
 
A well-established approach for analysing different economic systems, the relationships 
between economic actors within them, and the institutions that countries develop in order to 
“secure the efficiency gains” (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 18) yielded by the industrial and 
financial structure, is the “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) perspective (Hall and Soskice, 2001b; 
Hancké et al., 2007b). This approach has proved to be a sound analytical tool and has found 
application in a wide range of issues in comparative political economy (see e.g. Watson, 2003; 
Brinegar et al., 2004; Estevez-Abe, 2005; Hall and Gingerich, 2009). VoC is particularly useful 
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for the present analysis because it offers two main advantages over other approaches: a) it 
analyses how some countries achieve efficient economic performance as well as institutional 
stability (which are exactly the aims of competition enforcement, but reached through a clearly 
different mechanism); and b) it focuses on institutional set-ups that have remained quite stable 
over the last 20 years (the time range in which most NCAs were established).  
 
According to the VoC perspective, both coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal 
market economies (LMEs) are able to achieve better economic performance than “mixed 
market economies” (MMEs). The reason lies in their “coherence”: while CMEs guarantee 
efficiency via negotiated salary moderation, highly centralized firm-union bargaining and 
moderate competition between firms, LMEs achieve similar results through a more 
decentralized labour market, a greater use of stock market capitalization, and higher 
competition between firms. Countries that share features of both types are usually defined as 
MMEs. This category has not been analytically developed so far, and scholars tend to use it 
both for “Mediterranean” (Molina and Rhodes, 2007) and for Eastern-European (Mykhnenko, 
2007) economies. Mediterranean countries seem to have developed “specific kinds of 
capacities for non-market coordination in the sphere of corporate finance”, while having “more 
liberal arrangements in the sphere of labour relations” (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 21; Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009: 458). Another approach has highlighted that in these countries a state-led 
model of coordination lasted longer than in CMEs and LMEs (Thatcher, 2007: 154-156). 
Although it is difficult to argue that this set of features applies to all the countries that cannot be 
defined either as LMEs or as CMEs, MMEs can generally be considered as economies that do 
not fully benefit from the comparative advantages of the two main “varieties” of capitalism. 
Hall and Gingerich (2009: 465–473) have found empirical support for this claim, showing that 
higher rates of economic growth are associated both with high levels of market coordination 
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(LMEs) and with high levels of strategic coordination (CMEs). 
 
Recalling the initial assumption – i.e. that politicians always prefer not to delegate in salient 
policy fields as long as they can – we can hypothesize that the tendency to delegate to NCAs 
may vary with respect to the type of economic system. Both LMEs and CMEs provide an 
economic environment that is a) more coherent and b) more efficient as regards its 
performance. Hence, politicians of these countries should be less in need of giving 
independence to their NCAs. On the other hand, legislators in mixed market economies face a 
higher cost for not sending a strong signal of commitment to competition to the market. Where 
coordination is weaker, legislators may try to compensate for this “comparative disadvantage” 
by setting up an independent NCA. Therefore, the hypothesis is that mixed market economies 
will have more independent competition authorities than coordinated market economies and 
liberal market economies. 
 
 
DATA, OPERATIONALIZATION AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variable, in this empirical analysis, is the formal independence of the NCAs in 
the 27 EU member states. Data on all the known features of formal independence have been 
collected with a survey (see Appendix 1) that has been sent to all the agencies.7 In order to 
build an index of formal independence, all the indicators drawn from the survey have been 
conflated into one. To do so, I have neither assigned the same weight to all the indicators, nor 
have I divided them into categories (appointment of the head, appointment of the board, 
relationship with parliament and government, etc.) and then given the same weight to all the 
categories (as was done in similar studies). Such arrangements, in fact, are arbitrary, and might 
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lead the author to impose her/his own beliefs on the data, assigning weights and relevance 
according to her/his prior expectations.  I have instead employed factor analysis to estimate the 
amount of the latent trait (independence, in this case) in each item. With this method, the 
weight of the items depend on how much they “adhere” to the latent trait common to all the 
variables across all observations.8 To form the index, the items have been weighted according 
to their scores for the first factor.9 The factor loadings of the items are shown in Appendix 2. 
Figure 1 presents all the competition authorities ordered according to the calculated 
independence index. 
 
To test the hypothesis presented in the previous section – that LMEs and CMEs have less 
independent NCAs than MMEs – I employ data on the level of employer density, measured as 
the proportion of wage and salary earners in employment who work in firms organized in 
employers’ associations. Such an indicator gives a very good estimate of the level of 
coordination among firms: the higher the number of firms in employers’ association, the higher 
the level of coordination. These data have been retrieved from the ICTWSS database (Visser, 
2011), which codes the institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage setting and other 
labour market features in 34 countries between 1960 and 2010.10 For all the countries included 
in this analysis, the mean value in the period 1990-2009 has been calculated.11 
 
If the hypothesis is confirmed, the relationship between employer density and independence 
should be “horseshoe-shaped”. This means that with the following specification: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖2 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
where 𝑌 is formal independence, 𝑋 is the employer density and 𝜀 is the error term, 𝛽1 should be 
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positive and 𝛽2 should be negative.  
 
 
Figure 1: Formal independence of the 27 national competition authorities 
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Three control variables are also estimated in this model. The first is an indicator of political 
polarization, which measures, for each country, the dispersion of a distribution containing a 
left-right value for each executive from 1990 to 2008.12 This indicator captures how much 
variation there has been among governments in office over this period. The reason for 
including this control is that greater polarization reflects in higher uncertainty about policy 
outcomes: high political distance gives rise to the risk that economic regulation may not remain 
stable over time (see Frye, 2002, 2010; Guardiancich and Orenstein, 2012). Since agencies are 
established exactly in order to mitigate these problems, political uncertainty should be 
positively correlated with formal independence – as has been proved, among others, by Gilardi, 
(2002, 2005a) and Wonka and Rittberger (2010).  
 
The second control is the length of a country’s EU membership, obtained by simply subtracting 
the year of accession to 2009 (when the survey data were collected). As said before, the EEC 
has been extraordinarily important in the diffusion of the principles of competition in the 
member states. Although there has never been a formal obligation to have a competition 
authority, many countries established agencies in response to EEC/EU politics (Börzel and 
Risse, 2003; Héritier, 1997; Kassim, 2003; Schmidt, 2001). In the field of competition policy, 
this process of Europeanization has been particularly intense (McGowan and Wilks, 1995; 
McGowan, 2005). As EU politics affect domestic politics also through informal channels 
(Checkel, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Radaelli, 2008) and via the creation of homogeneous epistemic 
communities (Lee and Strang, 2006; McNamara, 2002), older EU members are more likely to 
have been influenced by the importance assigned at the EU level to the principles of 
independence and impartiality related to competition enforcement. For this reason, I expect a 
positive effect of length of EU membership on formal independence of NCAs.  
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The third control is the year of establishment of the authority. Undoubtedly, the importance 
assigned to the use of independent agencies in regulation has grown substantially over the last 
30 years, and independence of administrative agencies from the executive has become 
increasingly accepted in Europe and throughout the rest of the world (Gilardi, 2005b; Jordana 
and Levi-Faur, 2005; Levi-Faur, 2005). It is therefore plausible that NCAs established more 
recently have been granted more independence than “older” ones. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 
The model illustrated above is tested with a linear regression analysis (see Table 1). The 
coefficient of the employer density indicator is positive, and that of its square is negative, as  
Dependent variable:  
Formal independence of NCAs  
EMPLOYER DENSITY 7.51 
[0.55, 14.47] 
EMPLOYER DENSITY (squared) -6.50 
[-12.61, -0.40] 
POLARIZATION 0.90 
[0.39, 1.41] 
EU MEMBERSHIP 0.02 
[0.01, 0.04] 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 0.05 
[0.01, 0.09] 
Intercept 
-101.89 
[-173.10, -34.24] 
Adjusted R² 0.48 
F 5.72 
 
Method: linear regression. 95% confidence intervals in brackets.  
F-value significant at <0.01. N=27. 
 
Table 1: Linear regression model 
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hypothesized. Countries with low and high employer density have more independent authorities 
than countries with mid-level employer density. The control variables’ estimates are all 
positive, as expected. The model does not violate any OLS assumption: the standard errors 
variance is homogeneous13 through the whole population and there are no suspicious outliers.14 
Therefore, the correlation between explanatory variables and dependent variable can be 
confidently interpreted.   
 
The estimated relationship between employer density and formal independence of NCAs is 
illustrated in Figure 2.15 As can be observed, the relationship is horseshoe-shaped, as 
hypothesized: higher degrees of independence are found among countries located at the centre 
of the distribution. Figure 316 provides a clear picture of the relationship between three of the 
variables included in the regression and formal independence of NCAs. Each value of the 
Figure 2: Estimated relationship between employer density and formal independence of 
NCAs. Dashed lines denote 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 3: Expected values of formal independence of NCAs for different levels of the predictors 
 
dependent variable has been estimated through 1000 bootstrapped simulations.17 For every 
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regressor, the values of NCAs’ independence have been simulated setting the explanatory 
variable at different values while keeping all the others at their mean value.18  As regards 
employer density, we notice again that the countries with an expected independence value 
below the mean are those having, respectively, high and low employer density. It is worth 
observing that, among the two extremes, NCAs in CMEs perform better than those in LMEs, in 
terms of formal independence. This may be due to the fact that, with regard to competitiveness 
and openness to investments, CMEs are perceived (or perceive themselves) as a less favourable 
environment than LMEs, given the importance they assign to strategic coordination between 
firms – a feature that might discourage foreign investors. The difference in formal dependence 
between the agency of an extreme LME and that of a country at the centre of the distribution is 
around 22%, while an extreme CME has, on average, a NCA that is 13% less independent than 
that of a median-employer-density country. Finally, the simulation shows that, according to the 
estimated regression, a shift from low to high polarization causes a relevant increase in formal 
independence (around 36%). Also the EU membership effect is remarkable: the oldest member 
states tend to have competition agencies that are 27% more independent than those of the most 
recent members.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article, I have shown that the independence of national competition agencies in the EU 
does not depend on the particular policy that they implement. A notable finding of this 
empirical analysis is that NCAs’ independence does not even appear to be influenced by 
“ideological” constraints. As “coordination through competition” is the distinctive feature of 
liberal market economies, one would expect such countries to have more independent 
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competition authorities, which would “secure” their advantage compared to coordinated and 
mixed market economies. Instead, the data show a different picture, with both CMEs and 
LMEs having less independent competition authorities than other countries. The explanation 
advanced and tested in this article partially disconfirms the expectation of VoC theorists that 
institutions should coherently follow the economic set-up, and firms’ method of coordination in 
particular. The results indicate that, whatever the reason (which has to be further investigated), 
national competition authorities are not at the core of the institutional organization that 
distinguishes CMEs from LMEs. Either they are scarcely important in determining the 
investors’ assessments on a country’s profitability and reliability, or the politicians’ interest in 
controlling competition policy enforcement prevails on economic efficiency concerns. 
 
What we can certainly argue after this analysis is that independence of NCAs does not 
automatically correlate with the degree of “liberalism” of an economy – and this was not 
necessarily a predicted outcome. Countries that have been keener to adopt a neo-liberal agenda 
did not end up establishing more independent regulators. This highlights, first of all, that the 
rise of the regulatory state has not been a homogenous process, but rather a wave of reforms 
characterized by notable differences between countries. It also points out that the principal-
agent framework has a good explanatory power when delegation and discretion are concerned. 
Most questions regarding regulatory independence can be analysed by considering the 
poiticians’ incentives and disincentives to delegation, which depend on the policy field and on 
the ex-ante situation of countries. 
 
The most important theoretical contribution of this article lies in its successful attempt to use a 
VoC perspective to explain institutional choices in which legislators are not passive translators 
of equilibriums reached by firms and other economic actors. An often noted drawback of the 
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VoC approach, at least in its earlier formulations, is that it is too functionalist (Allen, 2004; 
Howell, 2003) and it tends to underestimate the role of the state (Hancké et al., 2007a: 23 ss.; 
Schmidt, 2009; Watson, 2003). In the theoretical framework presented in this article, instead, 
politicians do not necessarily make decisions that are coherent with the structure of firms’ 
organization. They rather make use of comparative advantages of their economic systems in 
order to retain more control on certain policies – competition enforcement in this case. 
Analyses like this can enrich and expand the range of possible applications of VoC theory. 
Tests on delegation processes in other policy fields may shed new light on causal mechanisms 
that are still not easy to delineate. From an empirical point of view, it is of primary interest to 
ascertain whether politicians are correct in underestimating the impact of NCAs’ independence. 
We have seen that only lawmakers in mixed market economies give considerable independence 
to competition regulators. Politicians in LMEs and CMEs are apparently confident that having 
a competition agency with little independence cannot harm their country’s attractiveness 
among foreign investors. Is this belief sound? Does independence ultimately matter? This 
question, all in all, appears to be the real cornerstone of any critical assessment of the rise of the 
regulatory state. 
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NOTES 
1  “Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings”.  
2 EC Regulation 1/2003 prescribes that all the European competition authorities have to 
implement art. 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
prohibit agreements restricting competition and abuses of dominant position.  
3  See, in particular, Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. 
4  If 
𝐴 = 〈𝐴1,𝐴2, … ,𝐴𝑛−1 𝐴𝑛〉 
𝐵 = 〈𝐵1,𝐵2, … ,𝐵𝑛−1,𝐵𝑛〉 
𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝑁 [1;𝑛] 
and 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝐵), then: 
if  ∀ 𝐴𝑖: 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖, then  ∀ 𝐵𝑗: 𝐵𝑗 = 𝐵𝑗. 
5  In this article, by the terms “legislators”, “lawmakers” and “politicians”, I will refer to 
members both of the parliament and of the government. As a matter of fact, especially in the 
countries studied here, it is impossible to attribute political decisions either to one body or to 
the other: in all the EU member states (except Cyprus), the government must have the 
confidence of the parliament, and distinguishing between the two makes little sense. 
6  As Koop (2011) has shown, regulatory agencies are more accountable (i.e. less independent) 
in highly salient policy fields. 
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7 The survey, collected between September and December 2009, was mainly based on 
Gilardi’s (2002; 2005) one, which was drawn from that of Cukierman et al. (1992). Some 
adjustments were also suggested by Hanretty and Koop (2012). 
8 The problems connected with the assumptions often made to construct these indices are 
discussed by Hanretty and Koop (2012). The factor analysis method, like all the others 
employed by other scholars, assumes that independence is uni-dimensional throughout the 
data. The index employed in the statistical analysis and another calculated with Gilardi’s 
method are correlated at 89%.  
9 Factor analysis has been performed on a data set including all the variables drawn from the 
survey, using the principal-component factor method. Since there were some missing values 
(and factor analysis by default deletes all the observations with missing values), I needed to 
impute them using multiple imputation. The original dataset contained 99 missing values 
out of 1053 values (9%). However, it must be considered that 8 authorities had 9 missing 
values each because they do not have a board -- therefore, they could not answer the 
questions of the survey which regarded the board. If we exclude these 72 “inevitable” 
missing values, the missing values due to a lack of answer were only 27 (2.5%). The 
Multiple Imputation command (in PASW 18) has generated five imputed data sets. To 
obtain the matrix for factor analysis, I have calculated the mean across these five 
replications for every value in the data sets. 
10  This database was used because it contains data on all the EU member states – a 
requirement for this analysis. 
11  For some countries yearly data are not available. However, there is very little variation 
across time (the average coefficient of variation is very low, 0.04) among all cases. 
Therefore, missing values are little likely to bias the calculated mean value.  
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12  The polarization value for each country is the standard deviation of this distribution, 
calculated with the formula 
𝑃 = �1
𝑛
� (𝐿𝑅𝑡 − 𝜇𝐿𝑅)22008
𝑡=1990
 
 where: 
 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is the left-right value, in a scale going from 0 (maximum left) to 10 (maximum right), 
for each country in year 𝑡;  
𝜇𝐿𝑅 is the mean of this value across the period of interest. 
𝑛 is the number of years included in the calculation. 
 The left-right position of each country's government for each year has been calculated as: 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 1∑ 𝑆𝑥𝑛𝑥=1 �𝐿𝑅𝑥𝑆𝑥𝑛𝑥=1  
 where:  
𝑆𝑥 is the number of seats that party x holds in the parliament in year t; 
𝐿𝑅𝑥 is the left-right position of that party; 
𝑛 is the number of the parties supporting the government in year 𝑡.  
All the data for these indicators have been taken from the ParlGov database 
(http://www.parlgov.org) (Doering and Manow, 2010). The polarization index is a 
component of the “replacement risk” indicator developed by Franzese (2002). 
13  The studentized Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979; Zeileis and Hothorn, 2002) 
reports a statistic of 5.10 with 5 degrees of freedom, which is significant at 0.32. 
14  The Bonferroni outlier test (Fox and Weisberg, 2010) does not indicate the presence of any 
p-value lower than 0.05 (the smaller Bonferroni p-value is 0.75). 
15  The graph in Figure 2 has been obtained by simulating expected values and standard 
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deviation for each permille of the employer density’s distribution (10000 simulations for 
each permille). Simulations have been performed with the programme Zelig (Imai et al., 
2009) in R (R Core Team, 2012). For a discussion of the logic and the advantages of 
simulation over other post-estimation methods, see (King et al., 2000). 
16  The code for the graph in Figure 3 has been taken from one of the examples presented by 
(Kastellec and Leoni, 2007).  
17  Bootstrapped simulations have been performed with the programme Zelig (Imai et al., 
2009) in R (R Core Team, 2012). 
18  For the employer density indicator, the three values have been set, respectively, to the 5th, 
the 50th and the 95th percentile (0.22, 0.6, 0.85). For polarization, the two values have been 
set at the 5th and 95th percentile (0.45, 2.01). For EU membership, the three values have been 
set at the minimum, the mean, and the maximum (2, 23, 57). 
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Appendix I 
Survey on the formal independence of competition authorities 
 
I − The Head of the Authority  
1) Does the head of the authority have a fixed term of office?  
Yes  
No 
 
2) If there is a fixed term, how long is it?  
< 4 years  
5 years  
6 years  
> 6 years  
 
3) Who appoints the head of the authority?  
One or two ministers  
The prime minister  
The government collectively  
The government and the head of the state  
The head of the state  
The legislature  
The presidents of the chambers  
The legislature and the government combined  
 
4) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the dismissal of the head of the authority?  
Yes 
No 
 
5) Can the head of the authority be dismissed? 
Can be dismissed for reasons related to policy 
Can be dismissed only for reasons not related to policy 
Cannot be dismissed 
 
6) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the incompatibility of the head of the authority with 
other public offices? 
Yes  
No 
 
7) Can the head of the authority hold other offices in government?  
Yes, with permission of the government 
Yes, in some cases specified by the law 
No 
 
8) Is the term of the head of the authority renewable? 
Yes, more than once 
Yes, once 
No 
 
9) Is political independence a formal requirement for the appointment of the head of the authority? 
Yes 
No 
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II − The board of the authority 
1) Does the authority have a board? 
Yes 
No 
 
2) Do the members of the board of the authority have a fixed term of office? 
Yes 
No 
 
3) If there is a fixed term, how long is it?  
< 4 years  
5 years  
6 years  
> 6 years  
 
4) Who appoints the members of the board of the authority?  
One or two ministers  
The government collectively  
The government and the head of the state  
The legislature  
The presidents of the chambers  
The minister consulting the head 
The head of the authority  
 
5) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the dismissal of the members of the board of the 
authority?  
Yes 
No 
 
6) Can the members of the board of the authority be dismissed? 
Can be dismissed for reasons related to policy 
Can be dismissed only for reasons not related to policy 
Cannot be dismissed 
 
7) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the incompatibility of the members of the board of the 
authority with other public offices? 
Yes  
No 
 
8) Can the members of the board of the authority hold other offices in government?  
Yes, with permission of the government 
Yes, in some cases specified by the law 
No 
 
9) Is the term of the members of the board of the authority renewable? 
Yes, more than once 
Yes, once 
No 
 
10) Is political independence a formal requirement for the appointment of the members of the board of 
the authority? 
Yes 
No 
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III − Formal relationship of the authority with the parliament and the government 
1) Is the independence of the authority explicitly stated in the law? 
Yes 
No 
 
2) What kind of autonomy is the authority granted? [multiple answers possible] 
Decisional autonomy 
Organizational autonomy 
Financial autonomy 
 
3) What are the formal obligations of the authority vis-à-vis the government?  
The authority must present reports more than once a year for approval 
The authority must present only one annual report that must be approved 
The authority must present an annual report for information only 
The authority has no formal reporting obligations 
 
4) What are the formal obligations of the authority vis-à-vis the parliament?  
The authority must present only one annual report that must be approved 
The authority must present an annual report for information only 
The authority has no formal reporting obligations 
 
5) Who, other than a court, can overturn an authority’s decision? 
The government, in specific circumstances 
A specialized body 
None 
 
6) What is the source of the authority's budget? 
Government funding only 
Fees levied on firms subjected to the authority's action and government funding 
 
7) Who controls the authority's budget? 
The government alone 
Both the authority and the government 
The accounting office or court 
The authority alone 
 
8) Who decides on the authority’s internal organization?  
Both the authority and the government 
The authority alone 
 
9) Who is in charge of the authority’s personnel policy? 
Both the authority and the government 
The authority alone 
 
IV − Other prerogatives of the authority 
1) What are the powers of the competition authority vis-à-vis sectorial agencies in case of competence 
overlapping? 
Sectorial agencies have priority over the competition authority 
None has priority: agencies have to coordinate 
The competition authority has priority over sectorial agencies 
 
2) Does the authority have the power to set up its own rules of procedure in its activities? 
No, never 
Only in some activities 
Yes, in every activity 
34 
 
 
3) Does the authority have the power to adopt precautionary measures during investigations? 
No, never 
Only in some domains of investigation 
Yes, in every domain of investigation 
 
4) What kind of sanctions can the authority impose? 
It can impose fines 
It can impose changes in the undertaking's governance  
It can close the undertaking 
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Appendix II 
Factor loadings of the items derived from the survey 
 
Items Factor loadings 
Head of the authority  
Fixed term of office 0.54074 
Length of the appointment 0.7124 
Who appoints the head? 0.52324 
Explicit provisions on the dismissal 0.30858 
Possible to dismiss the head? 0.52974 
Explicit provisions on incompatibility 0.69788 
Is there incompatibility? 0.2862 
Possible to renew the appointment? 0.57726 
Independence as a requirement 0.19844 
Board of the authority  
Is there a board? 0.3972 
Fixed term of office 0.5977 
Length of the appointment 0.70734 
Who appoints the board? -0.16664 
Explicit provisions on the dismissal 0.08804 
Possible to dismiss the board? 0.40354 
Explicit provisions on incompatibility 0.5982 
Is there incompatibility? 0.12164 
Possible to renew the appointment? 0.50028 
Independence as a requirement 0.26576 
Relationship of the authority with parliament and government 
Explicit mention of independence 0.51224 
Decisional autonomy 0.38512 
Financial autonomy 0.41234 
Organisational autonomy 0.30582 
Obligations vis-à-vis the government 0.22466 
Obligations vis-à-vis the parliament -0.60202 
Overturning body -0.18006 
Source of the budget 0.61944 
Control on the budget 0.01436 
Internal organisation 0.52756 
Personnel 0.00392 
Other prerogatives  
Powers in case of overlapping competences 0.188 
Possibility to set up rules of procedure 0.64212 
Possibility to adopt interim measures 0.28096 
Possibility to impose sanctions 0.1178 
 
